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BROADER-BASED & SECTORAL BARGAINING IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW  
REFORM:  
A HISTORICAL REVIEW 
Sara J. Slinn * 
Forthcoming in (2020) Labour / Le Travail, Vol. 85 
Compelling evidence exists that centralized bargaining structures, including broader-
based and sectoral bargaining (BBB), offer significant benefits to workers. This article 
explores why the labour movement, despite the potential advantages offered by BBB, 
has not collectively pursued BBB reforms. After briefly describing the concept of BBB, 
the author traces the history of BBB as an issue in each of the labour law reform 
exercises across jurisdictions in English Canada between the late 1980s and early 2019, 
examining the context in which these issues arose, identifying key BBB proposals, and 
challenges to these proposals. It concludes with an analysis of the failure of efforts to 
incorporate BBB proposals into labour legislation, and an assessment of the key 
challenges to adopting significant BBB reforms in the future.  
Departing from earlier research, the article identifies different explanations of the 
labour movement’s lack of support for BBB. First, while employers have opposed BBB, 
this not been a prominent feature in recent reforms. Second, it finds some unions’ lack 
of support for BBB is no longer due to lack of awareness and understanding of the 
concept, but arises from three sources: concerns about preserving existing 
representation rights; resistance to the prospect of mandatory councils of unions; and, 
anticipation of jurisdictional conflicts. An additional contributing factor appears to be 
the consensus approach taken by some peak labour organizations in deciding which 
labour law reform issues to promote. Finally, given the highly politicized nature of 
labour law reform, and, therefore, the political cost of innovative and untried changes, 
it is not surprising that governments opted to forgo such a contentious route, despite the 




Compelling evidence exists that centralized bargaining structures, including broader-based and 
sectoral bargaining (BBB), as well as bargaining at the national level, offer significant benefits to 
workers, including higher levels of collective agreement coverage, better labour standards and 
labour market integration for vulnerable workers, reduced unemployment, higher employment, 
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and reduced wage inequality.1 However, BBB had not been the subject of significant post-war 
labour law reform discussion in Canada, outside of Québec until the 1990s. Coinciding with 
economic and political changes posing critical challenges to the labour movement, this decade saw 
a wave of interest in introducing BBB arise across several jurisdictions. Originating in Ontario in 
the late 1980s, it spread to British Columbia as a key part of labour law reform discussions in the 
early and late 1990s and became a minor issue in the federal labour law reform review process later 
that decade.2 None of these reviews resulted in substantial BBB amendments to labour legislation. 
Since then, and despite the continuing decline of private sector unions, until the Changing 
Workplaces Review (CWR) of Ontario’s Labour Relations Act (OLRA) and Employment 
Standards Act (ESA) commenced in 2015, BBB had not re-emerged as an important reform issue.3 
BBB gained significant attention in the CWR process, and was also an issue in the subsequent 
labour law reform processes undertaken in Alberta and British Columbia. However, in none of 
these instances were BBB proposals or recommendations adopted.  
Why, despite the clear benefits to labour of BBB and the dire state of private sector 
unionism in Canada, did the labour movement not collectively press for BBB reforms? This article 
explores this conundrum. It begins by briefly describing the concept of BBB and noting the distinct 
experience of private sector labour relations outside of Québec in this regard. It then traces the 
history of BBB as an issue in each of the labour law reform exercises across jurisdictions in English 
Canada which took place between the late 1980s and early 2019, examining the context in which 
these issues arose, identifying key BBB proposals, and challenges to these proposals. It concludes 
with an analysis of the failure of efforts to incorporate BBB proposals into labour legislation, and 
an assessment of the key challenges to adopting significant BBB reforms in the future.4 
                                                          
 
1  For summaries of these research findings see: ILO, “Trends in Collective Bargaining Coverage: 
Stability, Erosion or Decline?” INWORK Issue Brief No. 1. (Geneva: ILO, 2017) and OECD, 
OECD Employment Outlook 2018, (OECD Publishing: Paris, 2018), Chapter 3,  
2 Although amendments to broader-based bargaining structures were also an issue in Québec in the 
1990s, that debate is not addressed in this article as it arose primarily in the context of contemplated 
reform of an existing sectoral bargaining scheme, rather than introduction of a new BBB model. 
3 Ontario, Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c 1, Sch A; Ontario, Employment Standards Act, 
2000, S.O. 2000, c 41. 
4 This study employs review of primary and secondary documents and semi-structured interviews 
conducted between October 2016 and May 2018. Interviewees include Cameron Dykstra, Director 
of Research, Alberta Federation of Labour, 26 April 2018; David Fairey, labour economist and 
research associate of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 15 December 2016; Ken 
Georgetti, former President of the BC Federation of Labour, interview by author, 13 April 2017; 
Stan Lanyon, mediator-arbitrator, interview by author, 7 November 2016; Vince Ready, arbitrator-
mediator, interview by author, 22 June 2017; Chris Schenk, former OFL Research Director, 
interview by author, 13 October 2016; John Weir, former staff director and labour researcher, BC 
Federation of Labour, interview by author, 12 April 2017; Fred Wilson, retired Director of Strategic 
Planning, Unifor, interview by author, 10 July 2017; Anita Zaenker, Director of Organizing, BC 
Federation of Labour, interview by author, 24 May 2018; two anonymous Union Representatives, 
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II. Broader-Based and Sectoral Bargaining  
Canadian labour legislation reflects the Wagner model, which is characterized by decentralized 
bargaining structures: highly fragmented bargaining units centred on bargaining between a union 
and a single-employer at the individual workplace level. Decentralization is, in turn, associated 
with reduced union bargaining power and lower rates of collective bargaining coverage, lower 
labour standards for vulnerable workers, higher unemployment, lower employment, weaker labour 
market integration of vulnerable workers, and greater wage inequality, compared to more 
centralized systems where bargaining occurs at sectoral, industrial or even national levels, as is 
common outside of North America.5 Moreover, in countries with enterprise level bargaining, 
collective bargaining rates and union density are not only low but declining,6 and where enterprise 
bargaining replaces more centralized arrangements, bargaining coverage rates fall substantially.7 
In addition, decentralized, Wagner model systems relying on a statutory certification 
process for access to collective bargaining, are criticized as effectively precluding many workers 
- particularly precarious workers - from accessing statutory collective bargaining.8 In contrast, 
BBB systems commonly provide more liberal access to collective agreement coverage than 
certification-based models. Consequently, BBB systems may be accessible to workers for whom 
the certification process is an effective barrier to collective bargaining.9  
Workers and unions are not the only parties who may benefit from BBB. Labour relations 
boards have expressed a preference for larger bargaining units, minimizing fragmentation and 
avoiding a proliferation of units, recognizing broader-based labour relations structures benefit 
employees, employers and contributing to more stable labour relations.10 Benefits to employees 
                                                          
interviewed by author 22 and 24 May 2018; and, one anonymous Labour Researcher, interviewed 
by author, 12 April 2017. 
5  For summaries of these research findings see: ILO, “Trends in Collective Bargaining Coverage: 
Stability, Erosion or Decline?” INWORK Issue Brief No. 1. (Geneva: ILO, 2017) and OECD, 
OECD Employment Outlook 2018, (OECD Publishing: Paris, 2018), Chapter 3,  
6 Jelle Visser, Wage Bargaining Institutions – from Crisis to Crisis, European Economy – 
Economic Papers, No. 488 (Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), 
European Commission, 2013), 12. 
7 ILO, Trends in Collective Bargaining Coverage, 6-7. 
8 See discussion at C. Michael Mitchell and John C. Murray, The Changing Workplaces Review: 
An Agenda for Workplace Rights – Final Report (Toronto: Ministry of Labour, 2017), 347 and 
Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Changing Workplaces Review – Special Advisors' Interim Report 
(Toronto: Ministry of Labour, 2016), 113. 
9 Jonathan B. Eaton, “Labour law reform for the new workplace: Bill 40 and beyond,”dissertation, 
University of Toronto, 1994, 323; Intercede, Toronto Organization for Domestic Workers' Rights 
(hereafter Intercede), Meeting the Needs of Vulnerable Workers: Proposals for Improved 
Employment Legislation and Access to Collective Bargaining for Domestic Workers and Industrial 
Homeworkers (Toronto: Intercede, 1993), 40. 
10 See C. Michael Mitchell and John C. Murray, Final Report, 347; North of Superior Healthcare 
Group v Service Employees’ Union Local 1 Canada, (2016) CanLII 55190 (ON LRB); SEIU, 
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include: greater worker mobility; common employment conditions across an enterprise; reduced 
focus on wage competition; and, may reduce contracting out of work. Employers benefit from 
greater administrative efficiency, and employer organization among smaller firms to 
counterbalance union power. Reduced conflict resulting from bargaining above the workplace 
level and opportunities for ongoing dialogue, and establishment of uniform conditions, may lead 
to more stable labour relations.11 
Rather than being a foreign concept, broader-based and sectoral representation and 
bargaining are long-standing features of collective bargaining regulation in this country, integrated 
within Wagner model systems. Broader-based and sectoral bargaining is a substantial feature of 
public sector labour relations in this country, particularly in British Columbia and Québec, which 
have long-established, highly centralized public sector bargaining structures, including 
negotiations occurring at the province-wide level. In contrast, BBB arrangements are uncommon 
in the private sector, arrived at either through statutory centralized bargaining or voluntary pattern 
bargaining, although labour legislation regulating Canada’s private sector has incorporated forms 
of BBB in varying degrees for decades.12 Both historical and contemporary non-Wagner model, 
broader-based bargaining, statutory regimes have operated alongside Wagner Model systems in 
the private sector. These include the industry-specific construction collective bargaining regimes 
established in most jurisdictions, provincial Industrial Standards Acts, Status of the Artist Acts, 
and Québec’s “Decrees” system. 13  Together, these suggests that broader-based representation and 
bargaining is an ingrained element of collective bargaining regulation in this country. 
The most prominent example of such a contemporaneous system is Québec’s Decrees 
system, allowing for “decree” extensions of specified collective agreement terms to apply to 
employers and workers in a designated geographic and industrial sector, although they were not 
parties to the original collective agreement, and regardless of union status. Established in 1934 to 
combat unfair competition in wages and working conditions, the Decrees system pre-existed the 
province’s 1944 Wagner model Labour Code, and the two systems continue to offer separate 
                                                          
Local 204 v Humber/Northwestern/York-Finch Hospital, 1997 CanLII 15494 (ON LRB); Island 
Medical Laboratories Ltd., (1993), 19 CLRBR (2d) 161. 
11 SEIU, Local 204 v Humber/Northwestern/York-Finch Hospital, 1997 CanLII 15494 (ON LRB), 
paras. 32, 33; Labour Law Casebook Group. 2018. Labour & employment law: cases, materials 
and commentary. 9th ed. Toronto: Irwin Law, 525. 
12 See for e.g. multi-employer bargaining structures available under BC collective bargaining 
legislation, which was narrowed in the 1990s (British Columbia, Labour Relations Code, S.B.C. 
1993, c. 82; British Columbia, Labour Relations Code, S.B.C. 1992, c. 82). 
13 Regarding development of the construction regime see Harry W. Arthurs and John Crispo, 
"Countervailing Power in the Construction Industry: Accreditation of Contractor Associations," in 
Construction Labour Relations, eds. H. C. Goldberg and J.H.G. Crispo (Canadian Construction 
Association, 1968), 376-415; see for e.g. Ontario, The Industrial Standards Act, 1935, SO 1935, c 
28; Québec, An Act Respecting the Professional Status and Conditions of Engagement of 
Performing, Recording and Film Artists, C.Q.L.R. c. S-32.1; Québec, An Act Respecting Collective 
Agreement Decrees, C.Q.L.R. c. D-2.   
5 
 
routes to collective representation and bargaining for workers.14 Although the system has declined 
in recent decades, it remains active. In this regard, Québec is exceptional and, therefore, this article 
focuses on jurisdictions outside of Québec, which lack a comprehensive, statutory BBB regime 
applicable to the private sector. 
Although BBB is an established element of labour relations systems in this country, this is 
not to say that it is easily reconciled with how enterprises prefer to organize their operations, labour 
relations, or workers. Employers still tend to oppose sectoral bargaining because it facilitates 
unionization, can lead to imposition of master agreements where no collective agreement would 
otherwise likely have been achieved, and is likely to reduce the availability of wage-based 
competition which smaller enterprises, in particular, may favour. 
III. Labour Law Reform in the 1990s 
Emergence of BBB proposals in 1990s labour law reform shared some common contextual 
features among jurisdictions. This period was marked by significant difficulties for labour, 
including negative public policy changes, widespread downsizing, growing use of lean production 
strategies, increasingly hostile employer attitudes towards unions, aggressively concessionary 
bargaining, and growing servicing demands on unions resulting from employer reorganizing of 
work systems. These developments drew on unions’ resources and resulted in less attention and 
resources being devoted to union organizing and community action.15 At the same time, labour 
market changes in the organization of work were producing a structural shift towards, and relative 
growth in, smaller workplaces.16 Voluntary broader-based bargaining arrangements, such as 
pattern bargaining operating in the unionized meat-packing, western forest, and Ontario brewery 
industries, had also collapsed as employers withdrew from these sector-wide arrangements.17 
These changes were accompanied by a shift away from high-wage, semi-skilled jobs to low-wage 
service sector employment, made more acute by a developing economic recession which widened 
disparities in conditions among different groups of workers, highlighting the limited relevance of 
the existing statutory labour system for a growing proportion of workers. 
During this period some scholars, as well as some in the labour movement, recognized that 
the changing economic context urgently required unions to recalibrate their approaches to 
organizing and retaining members.18 Moreover the fundamental inability of the Wagner Model to 
                                                          
14 Québec, Collective Labour Agreements Extension Act, S.Q. 1934, c. 56; Labour Relations Act, 
S.Q. 1944, c. 30. 
15 Pradeep Kumar, "Diffusing Innovations and Articulating Labour's Vision," Studies in Political 
Economy 74 (2004): 149.    
16 John O'Grady, "Beyond the Wagner Act, What Then?" in Daniel Drache, ed., Getting on Track: 
Social Democratic Strategies for Ontario (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 160, 
164–165; Charlotte A. B. Yates, "Staying the Decline in Union Membership: Union Organizing in 
Ontario, 1985–1999," Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations 55, no. 4 (Fall 2000). 
17 See Anne Forrest, “The Rise and Fall of National Bargaining in the Canadian Meat-Packing 
Industry,” Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations 44, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 393–408. 
18 Christopher Schenk, "Fifty Years after PC 1003: The Need for New Directions," in Cy Gonick, 
Paul Phillips, and Jesse Vorst, eds., Labour Gains, Labour Pains: 50 Years of PC 1003, (Halifax: 
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serve small workplaces well, and the crucial importance of this given the shift in employment 
towards smaller workplaces, had also become evident to many.19  
 Among the starkest warnings of the danger and futility to the labour movement of 
continuing to pursue traditional organizing was issued in the early 1990s by labour economist and 
former Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) Research Director, John O’Grady. Based on his 
assessment of the greater difficulty of organizing smaller workplaces under the Wagner Model and 
evidence of a structural shift towards, and relative growth in, smaller workplaces, O’Grady 
concluded that sectoral or regional bargaining structures would be necessary to effectively regulate 
the private sector labour market.20   
 Declining union density was also a feature of this period. Peak density of 37.9 per cent was 
reached in 1983–84 in Canada, and remained high throughout the decade.21 Pradeep Kumar and 
Gregor Murray identify the turning point for union density in Canada as the moment in the early 
1980s when labour force growth began outpacing union membership growth.22 While union 
density dropped substantially in the 1990s, the total number of union members continued to grow 
into the mid-1990s, although at a slower pace than before.23 Canada unions appeared to be in a 
relatively secure position compared to unions in other countries, and particularly the United States, 
which had undergone significant losses in aggregate membership and density.24 Some 
                                                          
Fernwood, 1995); Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment 
Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
19 O'Grady, "Beyond the Wagner Act, What Then?" 157–158; Yates, "Staying the Decline in Union 
Membership: Union Organizing in Ontario, 1985–1999." 
20 O’Grady, "Beyond the Wagner Act, What Then?" 157–158, 160, 164–165. Key changes in work 
organization included increasing part-time, casual and home-work, contracting out, and 
outsourcing. In contrast to O’Grady, Paul Weiler advocated adoption and adaptation of European 
works councils as a possible future for governing the private sector workplace. Weiler, Governing 
the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law, 283–295.  
21 W Craig Riddell, "Unionization in Canada and the United States: A Tale of Two Countries," in 
David Card and Richard B. Freeman, eds., Small Differences That Matter: Labor Markets and 
Income Maintenance in Canada and the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993), 110, table 4.1. 
22 Pradeep Kumar and Gregor Murray, "Strategic Dilemma: The State of Union Renewal in 
Canada," in Peter Fairbrother and Charlotte Yates, eds., Trade Unions in Renewal: A Comparative 
Study, (New York: Continuum, 2003), 202–203. 
23 Kumar and Murray, “Strategic Dilemma: The State of Union Renewal in Canada”; Pradeep 
Kumar and Christopher Schenk, "Union Renewal and Organizational Change: A Review of the 
Literature," in Pradeep Kumar and Christopher Schenk, eds., Paths to Union Renewal: Canadian 
Experiences (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2006a), 50–51. 
24 International Labour Organization, World Labour Report: Industrial Relations, Democracy and 
Social Stability (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1997). 
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commentators noted that this “membership illusion”25 fostered “a degree of complacency” within 
the Canadian labour movement.26 Scholars have also identified other internal factors, including 
labour’s fragmented structure, inter-union competition, and dilemmas about the focus of 
organizing efforts as key impediments to union renewal in Canada.27  
 As a result, union renewal debates were more limited and slower to emerge in Canada than 
elsewhere.28 Discussion of union revitalization strategies was limited, and within central labour 
bodies such as the OFL and the BC Federation of Labour (BC Fed) such concerns were met with 
resistance from leaders and affiliates.29  
 A final important contextual factor was political. Several jurisdictions also underwent 
significant swings in government during this period, as relatively labour- and worker-friendly 
social democratic parties came to power with strong majorities after long periods of conservative 
governments. Election of the New Democratic Party (NDP) in September 1990 in Ontario and the 
following September in BC, and election of the federal Liberal party in 1993, represented windows 
of opportunity for progressive labour law reform. However, the particular challenges faced by such 
reform differed substantially among jurisdictions.  
A.  Ontario in the 1990s 
The first concrete indication of labour interest in BBB in Ontario arose in policy resolutions and 
statements from the OFL’s 1988 and 1989 conventions. Key among these was the policy statement, 
The Unequal Bargain, which arose from a study of juridical extension systems commissioned by 
the OFL and authored by a researcher from Labour Canada.30 The Unequal Bargain set out a 
“Designated Sector” proposal for BBB under the OLRA, which was then adopted at the OFL’s 
1989 annual convention.31 The OFL was pursuing statutory mandatory multi-employer bargaining 
                                                          
25 Gregor Murray, “Union Myths, Enigmas, and Other Tales: Five Challenges for Union Renewal,” 
Studies in Political Economy 74 (2004): 157–169.  
26 Kumar and Schenk, "Union Renewal and Organizational Change: A Review of the Literature," 
51. 
27 Yates, "Missed Opportunities and Forgotten Futures: Why Union Renewal in Canada Has 
Stalled"; Kumar and Murray, "Strategic Dilemma: The State of Union Renewal in Canada"; 
Pradeep Kumar and Gregor Murray, "Canadian Union Strategies in the Context of Change" Labor 
Studies Journal 26, no. 4 (2002); Kumar and Schenk, "Union Renewal and Organizational Change: 
A Review of the Literature." 
28 Pradeep Kumar and Christopher Robert Schenk, "Introduction," in Pradeep Kumar and 
Christopher Robert Schenk, eds., Paths to Union Renewal: Canadian Experiences (Peterborough, 
Ont: Broadview Press, 2006), 15. 
29 John Weir, interview by author, 12 April 2017; Labour Researcher, interview by author, 12 April 
2017; Vince Ready, interview by author, 22 June 2017; Chris Schenk, interview by author, 13 
October 2016; Fred Wilson, interview by author, 10 July 2017. 
30 Labour Researcher, interview. 
31 Ontario Federation of Labour (hereafter OFL), The Unequal Bargain, 33rd Annual OFL 
Convention (Toronto: OFL, 1989), 8. The Designated Sector model proposed amending the OLRA 
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as a solution to what it regarded as ineffective OLRA voluntary employer council provisions. 
Following its 1989 convention, the OFL sought to develop broader support for BBB and repeatedly 
urged the government to strike a task force on what it termed “sectoral or broader-based 
bargaining.”32  
 However, support for BBB within the OFL itself was mixed including within the 
organization’s leadership which did not appear to regard it as a priority issue.33 Several private 
sector unions, including the Steelworkers, the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, and 
the United Food and Commercial Workers were supportive. However, a labour researcher involved 
in these discussions recalled that the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), a large private-sector union, 
was skeptical – if not hostile – to the idea.34 As a former OFL Research Director noted, the CAW’s 
militant approach to bargaining and strikes would not be readily compatible with being bound to 
a arrangement that would likely require more conciliatory relations among government, 
management, and labour, and less resort to bargaining power in disputes.35   
 Some public sector unions, such as the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) 
did not regard statutory BBB as particularly useful given that they already engaged in relatively 
centralized bargaining, reflecting OPSEU’s largely government worker membership. The 
Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), among the largest public sector unions in the 
province, was strongly opposed to the concept of BBB.36 Its opposition arose in part from the 
importance CUPE places on its locals’ independence and autonomy. CUPE regarded BBB as 
threatening such independence and local democracy and fostering bureaucracy.37   
  Even before the NDP came to power in Ontario in the fall of 1990, the predecessor Liberal 
government and the Ministry of Labour had been contemplating broader-based, legislative 
responses to certain difficult workplace issues. These included employer responsibility and 
successor rights in contract services; extending the scope of administratively complex pay equity 
legislation to workers falling outside the existing legislation and to smaller workplaces; and, a 
credible challenge to exclusion from basic ESA protections of certain categories of workers such 
as domestics, nannies, and agricultural workers, as a denial of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
                                                          
to permit the labour relations board to declare a group of employers engaged in similar enterprises, 
with workplaces of 50 or fewer employees and within a specified region, to be a “designated 
sector”. Councils of certified unions and councils of unionized employers would negotiate 
collective agreements. Agreements would apply fully only to unionized employers, but key 
economic terms would be extended to all employers in the designated sector.   
32 Chris Schenk, interview; OFL, "Submission by the Ontario Federation of Labour to the Ministry 
of Labour Regarding Proposed Reform to the Ontario Labour Relations Act" (Toronto: OFL, 1992); 
OFL, "Submission by the Ontario Federation of Labour to the Standing Committee on Resources 
Development on Bill 40" (Toronto: OFL, 1992). 
33 Chris Schenk, interview. 
34 Labour Researcher, interview. 
35 Chris Schenk, interview. 
36 Labour Researcher, interview. 
37 Labour Researcher, interview. 
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section 15 guarantee of equality rights. Recognizing that these were difficult issues to resolve 
through legislation, the government and Ministry was considering whether a solution might lie in 
BBB.38   
Shortly after coming to power the NDP commenced what became a two-year process of 
comprehensive OLRA reform. It turned into a highly conflict-ridden exercise, marred by leaks of 
confidential reports and mutual distrust and acrimony between and among the government, the 
Ministry, labour, and business. The Labour Relations Act Reform Committee was appointed in 
March 1991 by the Minister of Labour, Bob MacKenzie, and included arbitrator Kevin Burkett as 
Chair, union-side labour lawyer Elizabeth McIntyre as special advisor to the Committee, and three 
representatives from both labour and management. The Committee was given 30 days to consider 
specified issues relating to labour law reform, including the issue of “sectoral bargaining.” The 
badly fractured Committee’s final report, issued in April 1991, included separate labour and 
management side reports. The Chair “dissociated [him]self” from both documents, which the Chair 
subsequently described as “diametrically opposed.”39  
The labour side report supported BBB, but without mentioning the OFL’s Designated 
Sector proposal. Instead, it recommended appointing a task force to explore sectoral- or regional-
level bargaining as a means of extending representative structures to historically non-unionized 
workers. It identified what it labelled the “20/20 proposal,” which contemplated a form of minority 
union representation on established works councils for workplaces with more than 20 employees, 
as the type of concept to be considered by this task force, though explicitly noting that it did not 
“believe that concept is necessarily suited to Ontario's needs.”40 Meanwhile, the management side 
report dismissed sectoral bargaining as too complex and novel to address in the short period the 
Committee had available for its deliberations.41  
John O’Grady, labour economist and former OFL Research Director, produced a discussion 
paper in May 1991 outlining terms of reference, composition, timeline, and research issues for a 
provincial task force on broader-based bargaining and sectoral wage-setting.42 The OFL Research 
Director at the time, Chris Schenk, made suggestions for appointments to head the task force and 
to serve as research director, after the Ministry indicated that it couldn’t find anyone willing to 
                                                          
38 Unattributed, "A Sectoral Thrust to Labour-Management Relations: Background Paper for the 
Communications and Electrical Workers of Canada," (1992), 11, 16. 
39 Labour Relations Act Reform Committee (hereafter LRARC), Labour Relations Act Reform 
Committee Report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, 1991); Kevin M. Burkett, "The 
Politicization of the Ontario Labour Relations Framework in the 1990s” Canadian Labour & 
Employment Law Journal 6 (1998): 170. 
40 LRARC, Report of the Management Representatives (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, 
1991), 10–11, 13–14.  
41 LRARC, Report of the Management Representatives, 20. 
42 John O'Grady, "Discussion Paper on the Terms of Reference, Composition, Timetable and 
Research Plan for a Provincial Task Force on Sectoral Wage-Setting and Broader-Based 
Bargaining," 6 May 1991. 
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take on these roles.43 One labour researcher has suggested that many individuals who would have 
been regarded as candidates for such roles would likely have regarded BBB, and particularly an 
extension model such as the Designated Sector model, as “not a concept that you can graft onto 
our labour relations statute” and therefore would probably have been reluctant to participate.44  
 The Ministry’s August 1991 submission to Cabinet on OLRA reform options included 
proposing a task force on BBB and sectoral wage determination.45 A leak of, first, the labour-side 
report, and then the Cabinet submission, were met with strong opposition from business. This led 
the government to emphasize the public consultation process that would follow and to try to 
distance the subsequent bill from the options for reform presented to Cabinet.46 Neither subsequent 
Ministry submissions to Cabinet, nor the Ministry’s November 1991 Discussion Paper, proposed a 
BBB task force and the Ministry indicated to the labour movement that Cabinet would not entertain 
the idea at that time.47  
 Nonetheless, the government continued to show some interest in BBB, and in October 
1992, the Minister announced that a task force would be created, although it never materialized. 
The product of this law reform effort, Bill 40, came into effect in January 1993, but included no 
BBB provisions.48 
Thereafter, the NDP government made clear that Bill 40 would be the extent of its labour 
law reform efforts. Some in the labour movement concluded that, after the government had pushed 
Bill 40 through against tremendous employer resistance, it would have been too politically difficult 
to strike a BBB task force.49 In short, it appears that at this time in Ontario, the concept of BBB 
                                                          
43 Chris Schenk, interview.  
44 Labour Researcher, interview. 
45 "Cabinet Submission Analysis and Policy Options, Reform of the Labour Relations Act: Policy 
Options and Analysis (Confidential Document Prepared for the Ontario Cabinet)" ed. Ontario 
Ministry of Labour (Toronto: Ministry of Labour, 1991), 74. 
46 Judy Fudge, "Little Victories and Big Defeats: The Rise and Fall of Collective Bargaining Rights 
for Domestic Workers in Ontario," in Abigail B Bakan and Daiva Stasiulis, eds., Not one of the 
family: Foreign domestic workers in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 132. 
47 Unattributed, "A Sectoral Thrust to Labour-Management Relations: Background Paper for the 
Communications and Electrical Workers of Canada," 11, 16; Eaton, “Labour law reform for the 
new workplace: Bill 40 and beyond,” 314. 
48 Fudge, "Little Victories and Big Defeats,” 132; Eaton, “Labour law reform for the new 
workplace: Bill 40 and beyond,” 315; Ontario, Bill 40, An Act to amend certain Acts concerning 
Collective Bargaining and Employment, 2d sess., 35th Leg., 1992. Continuing government interest 
in BBB also included contributing financial support for a May 1992 conference, “Broadening the 
Bargaining Structures in the New Social Order: International Perspectives for Ontario,” held by 
the Centre for Research on Work and Society in cooperation with the OFL; commissioning studies 
on sectoral bargaining and its impact on low-wage workers, on the Québec Decrees system. Trade 
Union Research Bureau (hereafter TURB), "Broader Based Bargaining," (Vancouver: TURB, 
1992), 2; Eaton, “Labour law reform for the new workplace: Bill 40 and beyond,” 314. 
49 Chris Schenk, interview. 
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and a task force to study options became casualties of politics and extreme business opposition to 
comprehensive labour law reform, rather than opposition to the merits of the idea itself. 
Nonetheless, the OFL continued to be interested in BBB, and released The Big Picture, a 
comprehensive study of BBB in late 1993.50 According to the OFL Research Director at the time, 
Chris Schenk, this study did not attract much support or interest either within the OFL or among 
its affiliates, although it was widely circulated. He attributes this to corporatist interpretations of 
the study. The OFL did not intend it to promote corporatist reform, an approach which many unions 
would oppose. For instance, a corporatist approach would conflict with the militant character of 
some private sector unions’ approaches to bargaining and strikes. Conversely, some public sector 
unions which already engaged in relatively centralized bargaining with government did not regard 
corporatist initiatives as a priority.51   
B. British Columbia’s Industrial Relations Act Review 
Following decades of conservative Social Credit governments in BC, Michael Harcourt led the 
NDP to a fall 1991 election win. After many years of what labour regarded as aggressively anti-
union Social Credit labour law changes, there was a general expectation that the new government 
would undertake union-friendly law reform.  
 The NDP government promptly commenced two significant labour law reform exercises. 
First, in February 1992 a Sub-committee of Special Advisors on the Industrial Relations Act was 
appointed, composed of union-side labour lawyer John Baigent, employer-side labour lawyer Tom 
Roper, and mediator and arbitrator Vince Ready (the “Sub-committee”). It was tasked with 
reviewing the province’s general labour relations legislation.52 In March, the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Public Service and Public Sector was established to review labour relations and 
human resources practices and structures in the public sector and public service, under 
Commissioner Judi Korbin (the “Korbin Commission”). 
 The Sub-committee’s final report, issued in September 1992, proposed a form of BBB that 
would apply to small workplaces in historically non-unionized sectors. This proposal has become 
known as the “Baigent-Ready Model,” after the two Special Advisors who developed and proposed 
this recommendation in the Sub-committee’s final report. The third Special Advisor, the employer-
side representative, opposed this recommendation.53  
 The Baigent-Ready Model was among the few Sub-committee recommendations that were 
not incorporated into the new Labour Relations Code introduced later that year.54 In contrast, the 
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government did adopt the Korbin Commission’s June 1993 final report recommendations to 
reorganize public sector bargaining in the province into a highly centralized, broader-based 
structure, incorporating multi-party, two-tiered bargaining.55 
 Unlike Ontario’s earlier labour law reform exercise, in this case the Special Advisors, rather 
than the labour movement, were primarily responsible for driving interest in BBB reforms. At the 
time of the Sub-committee’s review, the labour movement in BC had not yet established a policy 
on BBB and there had been little discussion of the issue by or among unions. Moreover, the labour 
movement had not yet started to focus its efforts on under- or un-organized sectors, instead 
continuing to concentrate on servicing existing members.56 
 In contrast, Baigent and Ready were acutely aware of the implications of the changing 
economy and the associated shift towards smaller workplaces for collective bargaining and 
unionization and recognized that the Wagner Model was ineffective for smaller workplaces. These 
concerns were the genesis of the Baigent-Ready Model.57 Their efforts included meeting with 
representatives of the labour movement in BC and other provinces, and seeking input on, and 
trying to ignite interest in, a new, broader-based, approach to organizing and collective 
representation in small workplaces and under-represented sectors.58 According to then-President 
of the BC Fed, Ken Georgetti, the Special Advisors “… made a very compelling case to us that we 
should have a look at this kind of a model ….”59 At the same time, the President of the OFL was 
also encouraging the BC Fed to look at the BBB issue.60  
A small group of unions and unionists were actively interested in the issue and not only 
supported, but promoted, BBB options. These were primarily resource-based unions, such as the 
Steelworkers, the Canadian Paperworkers Union, and the Telecommunication Workers Union, 
which had histories of broader-based bargaining, either through their practice of organizing across 
occupations, industries, and establishments in resource towns, or through industry-wide bargaining 
councils.61 These unions were aware of the advantages of less fragmented bargaining structures 
for labour, and had experienced the negative consequences of the breakdown of broader-based 
bargaining, and the shift towards enterprise level bargaining that had been occurring in resource 
sectors since the 1980s. Consequently, they were interested in revitalizing BBB structures in their 
industries.62 
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Some public sector unions also pressed for BBB before both the Sub-committee and the 
Korbin Commission. The leadership of the BC Nurses’ Union (BCNU) was among the first in the 
province’s labour movement to support and explore the concept of BBB. Three health care unions, 
the BCNU, the Health Sciences Association (HSA) and Health Employees’ Union (HEU) made a 
joint submission to the Sub-committee to advocate for BBB reforms.63 At the time, these unions 
regarded sectoral bargaining as an organizing and growth strategy, and a means of slowing the 
expansion of precarious work in health care, particularly in the home care sector where work was 
rapidly being de-professionalized into contracted service work.64  
 Among the strongest advocates for BBB was John Shields, long-time president of the BC 
Government Employees’ Union (BCGEU).65 This union represented many workers in public and 
private health care facilities, including numerous care homes. Under Shields’ leadership, the 
BCGEU had focused on organizing new members, and on creating an extra-statutory system of 
BBB in the sector, composed of voluntary bargaining councils and multi-employer bargaining 
structures with sector-wide master agreements.66 The BCGEU, in particular, had been pressing the 
NDP to strike a commission to consider introducing a statutory BBB framework for the public 
sector in advance of the Korbin Report.67  
Overall, while there was interest and support for BBB among some unions in specific 
sectors and industries, it was limited. As one labour researcher recalls, “there was almost zero pick 
up in the labour movement itself on those issues.”68 According to Vince Ready, the Special 
Advisors’ efforts failed to elicit any real insights about broader-based options from the labour 
community, and the Sub-committee heard “virtually nothing” on the matter from those appearing 
at public consultation hearings.69 Moreover, few written submissions to the Sub-committee 
addressed BBB, with none offering specific proposals.70 According to a former labour researcher 
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involved at the time, the Special Advisors were frustrated with labour’s inability to “get [its] act 
together about what it wanted.”71  
  As a result, the Baigent-Ready Model was largely the product of the Special Advisors’ own 
deliberations,72 and “not really any sort of architecture from the labour movement”73 or 
academics.74 Labour researcher John Weir describes the resulting proposal as something of a 
compromise, explaining: “I think they were trying to find something that they thought would be 
politically acceptable to – or might have some viability in terms of – the employer-side.”75  
 Nonetheless, the employer-side Sub-committee representative, Roper, remained opposed 
to the Baigent-Ready Model. He contended that, if adopted, the proposal would favour labour, and 
therefore would be outside the Sub-committee’s mandate of proposing “fair and balanced” reform, 
and noted that few union submissions proposed BBB.76 He criticized the Baigent-Ready Model as 
contrary to the notion, accepted elsewhere in the Sub-committee’s recommendations, that 
collective bargaining is the best foundation for a bargaining relationship. Instead, this proposal 
would allow employees to vote to unilaterally impose a standard contract on an employer, one that 
may not be suited to that workplace or employer, and one that an employer may not be willing to 
accept. Moreover, Roper regarded the Model as “investment negative” and likely to create a cartel 
problem among small workplaces.77 A labour arbitrator contends that Roper’s key objection was 
                                                          
addressed through alternative approaches such as multi-employer or sectoral certification. The 
VDLC recommended striking a task force to consider whether a modified form of juridical 
extension would be effective, and amending the Industrial Relations Act to provide for mandatory, 
multi-employer bargaining and certification of a union or council of unions, and consolidation of 
units certified to the same union where the resulting unit would not be clearly inappropriate for 
bargaining. VDLC, "Memorandum to Special Committee of Advisors on B.C. Labour Law 
Reform," (Vancouver: VDLC, 1992), 1–2, 4; "Unfinished Business: Labour Law for British 
Columbia Workers," (Vancouver: VDLC, 1997), 14; Diane MacDonald, “Sectoral Certification: A 
Case Study of British Columbia,” 278.  
A joint submission of three health care unions, BCNU, HEU and HSA, called for BBB legislation 
to operate in parallel with the general collective bargaining legislation, which would incorporate 
all public service employers into sectoral bargaining structures. See HCUBC, “Submission to the 
Special Committee of Advisors on the Industrial Relations Act.”. 
71 John Weir, interview.  
72 John Weir, interview; Ken Georgetti, interview; Vince Ready, interview.  
73 John Weir, interview. 
74 Fred Wilson, interview. 
75 John Weir, interview. 
76 Ministry of Labour and Consumer Services, "Recommendations for Labour Law Reform,” 
Appendix 3, 35.  
77 Ministry of Labour and Consumer Services, "Recommendations for Labour Law Reform,” 
Appendix 3, 35. For counterarguments to Roper’s objections, see John Baigent, "What Is Sectoral 
15 
 
accurate: it would impose master agreements as first collective agreements.78 
 By including the Baigent-Ready Model in their recommendations in the Sub-committee’s 
final report, Baigent and Ready had hoped to spark a discussion on the issue, which had been 
lacking in the submissions and labour law reform process to that point.79 However, while the 
recommendation ignited employer opposition, labour continued to show little support for the 
proposal.80   
 In a comprehensive case study, Diane MacDonald describes employer opposition to the 
Baigent-Ready Model as “vigorous” and “often ideological,” with objectors concentrated among 
small and medium sized businesses.81 Employers objected to the loss of “flexibility” that they 
regarded as a necessary consequence of negotiations occurring at a level beyond the individual 
enterprise. Smaller employers, in particular, were concerned about the prospect of becoming 
subject to a collective agreement imposed on them reflecting different business strategies, such as 
quality and productivity competition rather than price competition, which these businesses relied 
on. This imposition would result in an agreement that is not tailored to the specific workplace. 
Finally, some of the employer opposition was also attributed to employers recognizing that the 
Baigent-Ready Model would likely increase access to unionization.82 
 Overall, the labour movement’s response was mixed, with labour leaders’ reactions 
described as “very divided.”83 This division reflected widespread uncertainty about how the 
proposal would operate,84 and a lack of understanding of the issue and its significance.85 The BC 
Fed President at the time described it as “ … such a new concept that people couldn’t get their 
heads wrapped around it.” In his view, the issue of BBB and this proposal in particular “ … came 
[up] too quickly and [it] didn’t give heads of unions enough time to really understand it and 
understand the implications of it.” However, he also noted that the unfamiliarity and uncertainty 
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“wore off very quickly. After the fact, but we could never get it back on the table.”86 Others felt 
that some unions accustomed to the enterprise bargaining structure “didn’t quite grasp the 
significance” of BBB.87  
 Many unions also had pragmatic concerns, seeing BBB and the Baigent-Ready Model as a 
threat to institutional union interests. They were concerned about inter-union competition, 
retaining bargaining rights, and the prospect of being forced into bargaining councils, and how 
inter-union disputes would be resolved under a BBB framework.88 In particular, some service 
sector unions were concerned that certain industrial unions with a strong emphasis on organizing 
would displace them from existing certified bargaining units.89 There was no consensus among 
unions about BBB, and some feared that sectoral certification would erode the place of individual 
unions in collective bargaining, and that employer-dominated unions would get the benefit of 
broader-based bargaining.90 Others were concerned that it represents a statutory solution to unions’ 
difficulties achieving certifications and first contracts.”91 Finally, some in the labour movement 
viewed the Model as akin to the Québec decree system’s extension system which, in their view, 
might “eliminate the need for people to join a union.”92  
Even supporters of the Baigent-Ready Model had – and continue to have – reservations 
about its feasibility. Key concerns include how, in practical terms, to impose a collective agreement 
on a group of employers, particularly in the case of franchise operations;93 and, the challenge for 
unions to achieve a sectoral designation and initial certification, and to also negotiate a first 
agreement that would be suitable and sufficiently attractive for workers in additional workplaces 
to choose to be certified to join the initially certified unit.94  
 Nonetheless, by the time the government came to decide which recommendations to 
include in the new labour legislation, the BC Fed sought adoption of several contentious Sub-
committee recommendations, including the Baigent-Ready Model of BBB. However, the Premier 
advised the BC Fed that the government was willing to adopt only one of the Sub-committee’s 
non-consensus proposals: either the Baigent-Ready Model or the replacement worker provision, 
and the BC Fed could decide which one.95  
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 In what has been characterized as “a historic choice,” a “historic failure,” and a decision 
made “for all the wrong reasons,” the BC Fed gave up the opportunity to have the Baigent-Ready 
Model included in the new labour legislation.96 After lengthy debate among the BC Fed’s 
executive, and then a vote, the replacement worker provision won by a single ballot.97  
 As then-President of the BC Fed, Ken Georgetti, explained, the replacement worker 
provision was really chosen for “the political optics of the labour movement,” and partly 
influenced by the fact that the Ontario government had recently introduced anti-scab legislation, 
so the feeling was that BC labour “had to have anti-scab legislation.”98 This outcome likely 
reflected still-vivid memories many senior union officers had of violent and corrosive disputes on 
picket lines relating to replacement workers that had occurred in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.99 As 
more than one interviewee explained, for many long-time unionists at the BC Fed at the time, their 
reactions to the issue of replacement workers was almost “visceral.”100 Therefore, even though the 
BC Fed President may have recognized the importance of the Baigent-Ready Model proposal, it 
was not possible for his view to prevail, given the strength of feeling by many officers about “anti 
scab” protection.101 Since labour was clearly a “divided house” on the issue of BBB,102 in contrast 
with unanimity on the replacement worker proposal, there was little pressure on, or incentive for, 
the government to adopt the Baigent-Ready Model.103 
 Ultimately, the Baigent-Ready Model was not included in the subsequent extensive 
amendments to the labour legislation the government introduced in October 1992.104 The 
government’s stated reason for not accepting the proposed Baigent-Ready Model was the 
uncertainty of its outcome and the restrictions it would impose on individual employers’ ability to 
bargain individual collective agreements.105    
 The failure of the Baigent-Ready Model proposal has been attributed to strong opposition 
from the small business community, with these concerns conveyed in Roper’s final report dissent. 
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In addition, lack of interest, weak support, and some opposition from labour; labour’s prioritization 
of anti-scab provisions; and confusion and lack of awareness from all quarters about the Model 
and the BBB concept are also identified as causes.106 MacDonald concludes that this last reason, 
a general lack of understanding of the meaning or significance of BBB, was among the key reasons 
this proposal was defeated. She found that some union officers were unaware that BBB was an 
issue before the Sub-committee, and there was significant confusion about the concept and how it 
might operate among those who were aware of it. Not only was labour ill-informed about BBB, 
but MacDonald found that some government officials were also confused about the Baigent-Ready 
Model.107 Nonetheless, the Baigent-Ready Model is still regarded as an innovative and powerful 
model.108   
C. Canada Labour Code Reform 
BBB arose as a minor issue in the mid-1990s review of collective bargaining under the 
Canada Labour Code, led by arbitrator and former Chair of the Alberta labour relations board 
Andrew Sims. 109 Struck by Federal Minister of Labour Lucienne Robillard in June 1995, the “Sims 
Task Force” also included Rodrigue Blouin, an industrial relations professor, and Paula Knopf, an 
arbitrator and former OLRB Vice-Chair.110 
The Sims Task Force Report, issued in January 1996, addressed several aspects of “multi-
party collective bargaining” in a chapter devoted to the topic.111 Overall, the Report demonstrated 
an equivocal attitude towards BBB stating that “There is nothing inherently wrong with broader 
based bargaining as long as unions and management remain free to revert to the simpler, single 
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enterprise system if they wish.”112  
Several union submissions to the Task Force advocated BBB for industries with low union 
density, intended to foster organizing in industries containing smaller, but similar workplaces. 
These “designated sector” proposals involved labour board designation of a sector identified by 
geographic scope and type of unit, following which all units certified within that sector would 
bargain together with an employers’ group, with most proposals contemplating the same union 
representing all employees in the certified units in the sector. Additional units would be added to 
any existing sector-wide collective agreement upon certification, and these would participate in 
the next set of renewal negotiations.113 These proposals bore clear resemblances to the earlier OFL 
Designated Sector proposal and the Baigent-Ready Model.   
Employers offered little response to these proposals, with objections centring on opposition 
to facilitating unionization, resistance to employers being required to bargain together, desire to 
protect the opportunity for wage and cost competition, and objection to newly certified employers 
being subject to a collective agreement they had not participated in negotiating.114    
The Report dealt differently with multi-employer and single-employer sectoral bargaining. 
Noting that the issue of multi-employer sectoral bargaining “lacks any widespread consensus or 
even understanding,” the Task Force did not recommend multi-employer sectoral bargaining. 
Instead, the Task Force recommended amending existing multi-employer bargaining provisions to 
ensure that employers could choose to engage in multi-employer bargaining, but could also 
withdraw and revert to individual bargaining in a subsequent bargaining round.115 
Nonetheless, the Task Force concluded that “the idea [of broader multi-employer sectoral 
bargaining] raises a point that, in our view, merits further consideration” recognizing that, in 
industries with large employers with multiple worksites, the existing requirement of majority 
support across the region impedes organizing and could result in certification being imposed on 
individual worksites against those workers’ wishes. In contrast, it also concluded that “we can see 
distinct advantages for both labour and management in having the Code allow a single employer 
but multi-establishment variant to the sectoral bargaining scheme.”116 
Ultimately, the Task Force recommended adoption of a limited model of BBB, which it 
labeled “single-employer sectoral bargaining” recognizing that this model “offers efficiencies to 
both sides.”117 Under this model, the labour board could consolidate bargaining for existing 
certifications of the same employer. Subsequent certifications to that employer could later apply 
to be included in the consolidated bargaining. However, this was not included in the subsequent 
amendments to the Canada Labour Code. 
The Sims Task Force was also directed to review BBB recommendations of an Industrial 
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Inquiry Commission into Industrial Relations at West Coast Ports and, specifically, the 
Commission’s recommendations regarding geographic certifications.118 The Federal Minister of 
Labour had appointed the Commission in May 1995 to make recommendations for more stable 
bargaining structures at West Coast ports, against a backdrop of frequent work stoppages. The 
Commission was underway at the time the Sims Task Force was appointed and its final report was 
issued in November 1995, two months before the final report of the Task Force. The Commission’s 
Final Report included recommendations to broaden bargaining unit structures in grain longshoring 
and related port industries.119  
The Sims Task Force disagreed with these recommendations, expressing skepticism that 
the potential benefit of BBB in reducing serial work stoppages outweighed the likelihood that 
negotiations would be impeded by issues relating to one part of broader units, and that this would 
encourage government intervention in the form of back to work legislation. Moreover, the Task 
Force regarded compulsory BBB as at odds with an increasingly deregulated and competitive 
transportation industry, concluding that “We find it difficult in such an environment to support 
what is, in effect, a more regulated labour relations regime in these industries.”120  
D. British Columbia Labour Relations Code Reform 
After the 1992 Sub-committee review, the issue of BBB “went off the radar” in BC for several 
years.121 In the meantime Glen Clark, a former Steelworkers and Ironworkers union organizer, had 
become Premier following Premier Harcourt’s February 1996 resignation, and led the NDP to a 
bare majority government in the May 1996 election. 
 The following July, Minister of Labour John Cashore appointed a committee of special 
advisors (the LRC Committee) to review the BC Labour Relation Code (BC Code), with neutral 
co-chairs Vince Ready and Stan Lanyon, and two members: union-side lawyer Miriam Gropper 
and employer-side representative Jim Matkin.122  
 An important backdrop to this review was the government’s failed attempt at construction 
and general labour relations reform earlier that year. The government had introduced Bill 44, 
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without consultation, in June 1997.123 Faced with overwhelming business opposition, the 
government withdrew the Bill weeks later, and announced it would commence a review of both 
the construction and general labour relations legislation. The LRC Committee noted that both 
labour and management had indicated that the Bill 44 episode had increased the parties’ 
polarization, and Lanyon later described it as “a shadow” hanging over the review.124 
 There was a general sense at the time that the government was unlikely to accept any LRC 
Committee recommendations to amend the BC Code, and that its real interest was in the 
construction labour review – not the general BC Code review.125 There was also widespread 
skepticism within labour about the likelihood of obtaining dramatic change to the labour relations 
structure, and doubt about how effective change might be if it did occur, particularly as the 
government was not seen as willing to push hard for general labour reform at that time.126 
 Broader-based bargaining (referred to as “sectoral bargaining” throughout the review) 
became one of the primary issues before the LRC Committee and was addressed by a majority of 
the submissions received by the Committee.127 
 By the time of this review, the labour movement’s growing awareness of the changing size, 
scope and organization of enterprises, particularly the growth of contracted out work and declining 
union density, made labour more receptive than before to new forms of representation, including 
BBB, as a means of countering these changes.128 Yet, a significant lack of understanding of the 
concept and its implications persisted among unions.129 A discussion paper introduced to labour 
representatives at a Canada Labour Congress (CLC) winter school shortly before the review 
commenced was received with “a great deal of puzzlement,” with one labour researcher describing 
it being as if the participants had been “presented … with a foreign concept that was so different 
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from the world they were familiar with that they had trouble understanding it.”130 
 Before the LRC Committee, unions pressed for legislative solutions to structural barriers 
to collective representation: primarily BBB and broader successor rights provisions. Unions 
contended that for smaller workplaces, particularly in the service sector, BBB provisions were 
required to address barriers to access to union representation that exist in for smaller workplaces.131 
 Nonetheless, the labour movement clearly had not yet reached a consensus on, nor even 
fully come to grips with, the issue of BBB. Submissions proposed a variety of forms of BBB. Most 
unions advocated for adoption of the Baigent-Ready Model, although some unions contended that 
BBB should be extended to all employees, not only those in historically under-represented 
sectors.132 It appears the United Steelworkers of America, District 3, was the only union proposing 
a different, innovative approach to BBB.133 Overall, unions’ interest in BBB tended to focus on 
contracted out services, such as janitorial work, rather than as a more broadly applicable model for 
restructuring collective representation and bargaining.134 
Employers “categorically opposed” both BBB and expanded successorship provisions. As 
in 1992, objections focused on the prospect of limits to competitive flexibility, imposition of “one 
size fits all” collective agreements, and employers’ convictions that BBB would have a particularly 
strong negative effect on small and medium sized enterprises.135 Disagreement about what BBB 
entailed persisted within the employer community, as noted by the LRC Committee:  
Some employers maintain that enterprise bargaining means one employer 
negotiating with one union, and that anything beyond this model is sectoral 
bargaining. They view multi-employer bargaining, coordinated bargaining, 
bargaining for master agreements, picking up the master agreement, and province-
wide bargaining as unacceptable "sectoral models."136     
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These employer attitudes existed even though many of these bargaining structures had long been 
present in the province’s labour relations without having been condemned as unacceptable forms 
of bargaining.137  The LRC Committee stated:  
We believe that sectoral bargaining, along with other sectoral strategies, have been 
devalued, in part because of the shift to global economies, and in part because of 
an over-emphasis on labour costs as the major impediment to successful 
competition. We encourage the business community to look at other economies, 
notably in Europe, where it is generally agreed that sectoral strategies enhance 
industry’s ability to compete.138 
In its January 1998 Discussion Paper, the LRC Committee explicitly recognized a private sector 
representation gap, intensified by a shift towards low wage service sector employment, and stated 
that “we believe these issues are serious enough to warrant specific attention to the problem of 
sectoral bargaining and successorship.”139 However, preferring non-statutory solutions, and noting 
that further research and discussion were necessary, the LRC Committee proposed establishing 
sectoral, joint labour-management industry advisory councils either under existing BC Code 
provisions for ministerial advisory councils or that would be non-statutory and voluntary.140 
 Final reports for both reviews were issued in late February 1998.141 Although the 
construction industry review recommendations were subsequently adopted, including a 
recommendation to reinstitute BBB in parts of that sector, none of the LRC Committee’s 
recommendations were enacted. The LRC Committee emphasized non-statutory approaches and 
solutions, and repeatedly mentioned the polarized context of the review, inflamed by Bill 44 and 
the economic situation. Although the LRC Committee did not recommend legislating BBB “at this 
time,” as Lanyon later noted, the Committee did not “reject [it] outright,” pointing out that “clearly 
much more work needs to be done by academics, government, and the parties in looking at these 
types of regulatory schemes.”142  
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However, in its final report the LRC Committee continued to recommend sectoral joint 
industry advisory councils, indicating that, with its recommendations “government moves away 
from its role of referee or regulator of these relationships to that of facilitator.”143 The LRC 
Committee also expressed the belief that “as other innovative strategies are put into place that 
involve joint labour-management collaboration at the industry or sectoral level, the issue of 
sectoral bargaining will cease to create the alarm and confusion that currently exists.”144 
 Failure to achieve legislative change in support of BBB in BC in 1998 has largely been 
attributed to vigorous opposition from the small business community, although MacDonald 
suggests that the lack of consistency among union submissions contributed to this failure, as did 
the government’s own lack of interest in BBB.145 Thereafter, the political situation in BC changed 
significantly. The Liberal party achieved an overwhelming majority in the 2001 election and 
retained a majority government until the spring 2017 election. Worker-friendly labour law reform 
was not on this government’s agenda, and BBB did not arise as an issue during this period. 
IV. Revival of Interest in Broader-Based Bargaining 
A. Ontario’s Changing Workplaces Review 
BBB next arose in Ontario during the Changing Workplaces Review (CWR) of the OLRA and 
ESA which commenced in May 2015 and culminated in Bill 148, introduced in July 2017 and passed 
in late November 2017.146 To this point the Liberal government, in power since 2003, had 
undertaken no review of, and had made only limited amendments to, the OLRA.147 However, the 
Liberals had committed to reviewing labour and employment legislation after their majority re-
election in June 2014, and some unions had been vigorously pressing for a combined review of the 
OLRA and ESA.148 
 In February 2015 Minister of Labour Kevin Flynn appointed Special Advisors Justice John 
Murray, a former employer-side lawyer and judge, and Michael Mitchell, an arbitrator and former 
union-side labour lawyer, to lead the review. The CWR’s mandate explicitly excluded 
consideration of construction labour relations, minimum wage, or matters being addressed by other 
independent review processes, such as pay equity, and broader public sector bargaining 
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 The context of this review was significantly different than Ontario’s labour law reform 
exercise in the 1990s. Not only was pay equity not an element in this review, but broader notions 
of labour rights under the Charter had new relevance. A series of Supreme Court of Canada cases 
issued since 2001 and culminating in a trio of decisions issued in early 2015, reversed decades of 
jurisprudence, finding that the Charter freedom of association encompassed protection of the 
process of collective bargaining, and recognizing strikes as both an essential element of the 
bargaining process and also protected by the Charter freedom of expression.150 
 Although the CWR was not plagued with the internal problems of the 1990s OLRA review, 
deep animosity towards the Liberals led some unions, particularly in the public sector, to be 
reluctant to participate in the CWR. This was related to the Liberal government’s contentious 
imposition of mandatory central bargaining in parts of the public sector.151   
 Proximity to the provincial election scheduled for June 2018 gave rise to skepticism about 
the government’s commitment to labour law reform as more of a strategic political exercise. The 
upcoming election may also have influenced the NDP’s approach to the CWR, which one labour 
researcher described as unsupportive, uninterested, cynical and giving the impression that the NDP 
“hop[ed] it would fail.” In his view, the review would have been able to achieve more if the NDP 
had supported the process.152  
 At the outset of public consultations, the Special Advisors explicitly sought input on whether 
BBB was “required either generally or for certain industries.”153 However, few submissions 
responded to this request, and fewer still offered specific input, instead often simply expressing 
general support for BBB.154 Notably, the OFL submission was silent on this issue.155  Instead, 
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during early stages of the CWR process most of the labour movement, including the OFL, had 
focused on incremental change to the OLRA, and a shortlist of priority issues.156 As explained by 
one labour researcher, the labour movement had made so few gains in labour legislation for so 
long in Ontario that there was no sense that significant advances could be made, so many unions 
concentrated on trying to “stop the decline … and get a couple of little things.”157 
Only the Steelworkers and Unifor submissions offered detailed responses on the BBB 
issue.158 The Steelworkers’ National Office submission urged adoption of a slightly modified 
Baigent-Ready Model, and also sought a provision to consolidate existing bargaining units of a 
single employer.159 Unifor’s submission contained extensive and detailed BBB submissions, and 
advocated strongly for a sectoral approach to both minimum standards regulation and collective 
bargaining.160 Unifor was convinced that the incremental change sought by much of the labour 
movement was insufficient, and had established a working group that devoted over six months to 
preparing the union’s CWR submission. According to the coordinator of this working group, its 
attitude was: “let’s make a seminal document. Let’s go for broke here.”161 
Two key ideas shaped Unifor’s proposals. First, that it was necessary to “secure the floor” 
of workplace standards, in order to make organizing and bargaining possible in precarious sectors. 
As the BBB working group coordinator explained, if labour is always “filling in the collapsing 
floor” under precarious workers, it cannot move forward in organizing and improving conditions 
for these workers. The second formative concept arose from Unifor’s foundational principles, 
which included the notion that labour’s role was to speak for and represent all workers, whether 
or not they were unionized. However, this perspective had opponents both among other unions and 
within Unifor itself. Opponents contended that if workers wanted union protection and rights they 
should join unions, and that an all-worker approach meant that many workers would never 
unionize.162 
Unifor’s submission included several BBB proposals ranging from a proposal for single-
employer multi-site bargaining, to certification covering all franchisees in a geographic area of a 
common parent company, to a proposal for non-worksite based occupational representation, to an 
innovative BBB proposal founded in an amendment to the ESA. Unifor had not believed, until the 
CWR process was already well advanced, that OLRA amendments facilitating BBB might be 
                                                          
156 Fred Wilson, interview. 
157 Fred Wilson, interview. 
158 Unifor developed a new model, addressed below. The Steelworkers pressed for adoption of the 
Baigent-Ready model. United Steelworkers (hereafter USW), “Submission by the United 
Steelworkers” (Toronto: USW, 2015). 
159 This submission proposed there be no minimum threshold number of employees in a workplace 
for the model to apply. USW, “Submission by the United Steelworkers,” 31–33. 
160 Unifor, “Building Balance, Fairness, and Opportunity in Ontario’s Labour Market” (Toronto: 
Unifor, 2015), 104–130.  
161 Fred Wilson, interview. 
162 Fred Wilson, interview. 
27 
 
politically possible, so the union’s most ambitious proposal relied on modifications to the ESA 
rather than the OLRA.163 
 The CWR Interim Report, issued in late July 2016, set out nine options for potential BBB 
amendments to the OLRA. In addition to maintaining the status quo, options included proposals 
for: multi-employer, multi-location certifications; extension of certifications or agreements; and, 
BBB models for specific industries or sectors. Some options involved detailed proposals, others 
were explicitly based on the Baigent-Ready Model, the Québec Decrees system, or the ISA (see 
Table 1, below).164 Option 5, which had been developed by the Special Advisors, was set out in 
greatest detail. This new proposal, modified the Baigent-Ready model by providing that multi-
employer, multi-location certification, voting, and negotiations would occur on a sector-wide basis, 
and an applicant union would be required to demonstrate to the labour board its commitment to 
sectoral representation, potentially including demonstration of a resource commitment sufficient 
to confirm the union’s willingness to attempt to organize the entire sector. 
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Table 1   Changing Workplaces Review, Interim Report, Broader Based Bargaining 
Options 
Option Summary 
1 Maintain status quo. 
2 Model providing for extension of negotiated provisions across a sector. Reflects the 
Québec decrees system, ISA, and Unifor’s proposal. 
3 Accretion of single location certifications of single franchisor/franchisee units with 
the same parent company leading to multi-location bargaining. 
4 Multi-employer, multi-location certification and bargaining, arising from single-
employer, location by location certifications, and based on the Baigent-Ready Model. 
5 A new proposal for multi-employer, multi-location certification and bargaining, 
involving sector-wide certification.  
6 A new proposal based on the accretion approach to BBB in the construction industry, 
permitting employer bargaining agencies in defined sectors and geographic areas, 
resulting unions being compelled to bargain sector wide agreements. Aimed at 
industries with existing, but fragmented, union representation and intended to support 
employer interests in BBB structures and to avoid union “whipsawing” and 
“leapfrogging”. 
7 A proposal, with no details provided, to develop a model aimed at vulnerable workers 
in precarious employment, such as home care workers, or (if exclusions from the 
OLRA were removed) agricultural, domestic or horticultural workers, where the 
Wagner model is ineffective. 
8 A model based on the Status of the Artist Act approach, to apply to freelance workers 
and dependent contractors. No specifics were provided. 
9 Create provisions of the OLRA applying to the media industry, artists and performers. 
No specific were provided. 
Source: Interim report. Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Changing Workplaces Review – 
Special Advisors' Interim Report (Toronto: Ministry of Labour, 2016), 122–126.  
 
The Interim Report sought input from the community on these options and a second phase of 
written submissions and stakeholder meetings followed. Unifor, at least, was surprised by the 
Interim Report’s clear willingness to entertain introducing BBB within the OLRA.165 Although the 
Interim Report elicited more union input about BBB than had been received in the first phase of 
submissions, relatively few unions engaged substantially with the issue. Most unions, and the OFL, 
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simply indicated support for several of the options in their phase 2 submissions.166  
 Although it appeared that the Special Advisors were most seriously contemplating 
recommending option 5, the proposal that they had developed, several unions raised concerns 
about that approach, regarding option 4, which closely resembled the Baigent-Ready Model, as 
more incremental, less disruptive, and more practical. Concerns included that option 5 would have 
sparked inter-union rivalries as it would result in either a single union or a council of unions 
representing a sector; that the sector-wide certification element would require a state of readiness 
to immediately deal with an entire sector that few unions would be able to muster; that it would 
produce a “large cultural change for many affected employers, and for workers”; and, that sector-
wide certification would be a substantial barrier to accessing sectoral certification.167 
 Notably, several unions expressed reservations about BBB, in general, concerned about 
protection of existing union representation rights. They urged that any introduction of BBB be 
limited to sectors without significant existing union representation, and that new BBB structures 
not displace established bargaining arrangements.168 Some unions also objected to sectoral 
certification models that might prevent unions from organizing in particular sectors.169 One of the 
province’s largest public sector unions, OPSEU, emphasized that BBB should be voluntary for 
unions and not forced upon unions as it had been in the education sector.170 
 The few employer submissions that addressed the issue opposed BBB and advocated for 
status quo.171 Opposition centred on assertions that such models are inappropriate for the private 
sector, that it “takes away the creativity, the competitive advantage that companies seek to 
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prosper,”172 and that it would conflict with different wage structures and hierarchies at different 
workplaces.173 Several employer associations expressed concern about the disadvantage smaller 
employers would face, even within a single franchise system, in a bargaining council;174 concern 
that smaller and medium size businesses would lack sufficient resources to bargain with larger 
unions;175 and, concern that larger firms would be advantaged over small and medium firms as 
they would be more able to manage the costs of a BBB bargaining structure, which may lead to 
smaller businesses closing, thereby reducing “employee choice” of types of workplaces.176  
 Public sector employer associations focused on the potential for BBB to change the balance 
of labour relations power, thus increasing the risk of strikes.177 Notably, while the Ontario Hospital 
Association opposed the Interim Report options, it recommended mandatory, statutory union 
councils for centralized bargaining in the hospital sector as a means of rationalizing bargaining 
structures.178 
 In late May 2017, the CWR Final Report was released. It dismissed extension models, 
including the extension model option based on Unifor’s proposal (Table 1, option 2), as being “out 
of keeping with Ontario’s history and culture” and concluded that determination of some 
workplace terms by the unionized sector, to be imposed on the non-union sector, was neither 
practical nor likely to be accepted, in the absence of a democratic means for employees to consent 
to these terms.179   
 The Final Report also rejected “multi-employer bargaining models” based on the Baigent-
Ready Model (Table 1, options 4 and 5). While noting that these models are “creative and worthy 
of further exploration” the Special Advisors concluded that it was it was not clear that this approach 
would work in sectors with little history of collective bargaining. It further noted that “no 
jurisdiction that we are aware of has imposed a mandatory multi-employer collective bargaining 
regime on employers in a sector without any history of collective bargaining in that sector. Such 
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an option, therefore, calls for a considerable degree of caution and careful assessment.”180 One 
concern was that, in multi-employer bargaining structures, larger businesses might collude to 
increase labour costs which might remove smaller businesses from the market. A further concern 
was whether, under these models, unions would be able to gain sufficient bargaining power against 
a heterogeneous group of employers. 181  
 The Report did not specifically address option 6, the construction accreditation model. The 
Special Advisors recommended that the government conduct inquiries and consultations regarding 
options 7, 8, and 9 (Table 1), which had suggested new models for industries with vulnerable and 
precarious workers, in which the Wagner Model is ineffective; for freelancers and dependent 
contractors; and, for the media industry.182 
 The Final Report did recommend amending the OLRA to adopt a BBB model which would 
be applicable only to franchisees of a single common franchisor, and which did not require 
including the franchisor in the bargaining structure. This recommendation appeared to be based on 
option 3.183 
 The most innovative BBB recommendation that appeared in the Final Report, reflecting 
Unifor’s key phase 1 proposal and reminiscent of Ontario’s former Industrial Standards Act, had 
not appeared among the Interim Report options. The Special Advisors recommended amending 
the ESA to establish “sector committees” to provide for sectoral regulation of workplace standards. 
The Special Advisors explained that this approach was more feasible and “a better more inclusive 
way to accomplish some improvement in outcomes for employees in smaller non-unionized 
workplaces” than an extension model, as it would allow for direct employee and employer input, 
with government regulation.184 
Bill 148, the Fair Workplaces, Better Jobs Act, 2017, was introduced and passed first 
reading on June 1st, 2017, a week after the Final Report was released. It contained no BBB 
provisions among the proposed amendments to the LRA or ESA, but did include two provisions 
giving the OLRB limited authority to consolidate bargaining units.185  
The NDP’s reaction to Bill 148 has been described as “muted” and the party offered no 
substantial response to the Bill until mid-August, at which time NDP Leader Andrea Horwath 
announced proposed amendments to the Bill.186 These amendments were not tabled until 
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November 2017, and focused on the ESA, with limited OLRA proposals, and no mention of 
BBB.187    
Bill 148 was significantly amended following two rounds of public consultations held in 
summer and fall 2017, and during Second Reading. Consequently, one of the bargaining unit 
consolidation provisions was dropped and the second was substantially narrowed. Bill 148 received 
Royal Assent on 27 November 2017, and the majority of amendments came into force on 1 January 
2018.188  
Following the June 2018 election of the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, Bill 47 
proposed repealing or replacing most of the Bill 148 amendments. Interestingly, Bill 47 provided 
for greater scope for consolidation of bargaining units than did Bill 148, by proposing to repeal the 
Bill 148 consolidation provisions and replace them with OLRB power to consolidate units certified 
to the same or different unions of the same employer where the existing units are “no longer 
appropriate for collective bargaining.”189 This would essentially adopt the Canada Labour Code 
consolidation provisions, which Ontario unions had objected to during the CWR review, as a threat 
to established representation rights. The OFL and other unions objected to these consolidation 
provisions, contending that it would cause instability due to conflict between unions, and arguing 
that loss of workers’ ability to select their bargaining agent undermines their freedom of association 
rights.190 
B. Alberta Labour Code Reviews    
In July 2002, Alberta Human Resources and Employment Minister Clint Dunford 
appointed a committee composed of three Members of the Legislative Assembly, to assess whether 
review of the province’s Labour Relations Code (Alberta Code) should be undertaken.191 
Following consultations during the summer of 2002, the MLA Committee submitted its final report 
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to the Minister in late November of that year. The government accepted the final report’s 
recommendations that no general review of the Alberta Code be undertaken, but that specific 
provisions merited review.192 BBB was not addressed in this review. 
 Neither BBB nor labour law reform returned to the agenda in this province for another fifteen 
years, after the Progressive Conservatives, in power since 1971, were displaced by an NDP 
government. In March 2017, Alberta’s recently-elected government announced a review of the 
Alberta Code and the province’s Employment Standards Code.193 This was followed by a brief, 
five-week consultation period, resulting in Bill 17 introduced in late May and passed early the next 
month.194 Andrew Sims, Q.C., arbitrator, mediator, and former chair of the Alberta Labour 
Relations Board, provided technical advice on the Alberta Code review. Although Sims’ mandate 
letter identified ten specific areas of the Alberta Code to be reviewed, these did not include BBB, 
and the government made it clear that it would not entertain significant innovations in these 
areas.195 As Sims told the press “this is not a cutting-edge, lead-the-country reform …. It is in most 
respects a bring-the-best-experiences-from-elsewhere to Alberta.”196  
The Alberta Federation of Labour’s submission included a general statement supporting 
sectoral bargaining, but made no specific proposal, and simply requested that the government 
“add the opportunity for unions in a recognizable sector of the economy to apply to the Board to 
bargain sectorally and/or in groups.”197 
Not surprisingly, particularly given the significant amendments necessary for Alberta’s 
workplace legislation to catch up to the norm elsewhere in the country, BBB was not a significant 
issue in this review, and the resulting Alberta Code amendments did not include any BBB 
provisions. 
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C. Revisiting British Columbia’s Labour Relations Code 
During the sixteen years of Liberal rule in the province, which had begun in 2001, the labour 
movement focused on simply “trying to defend the store” and “were just trying to hang on [while] 
sustaining some pretty heavy losses in terms of labour laws” and “most of the focus was simply 
on defending and trying to get back to some basic sort of ideas about bargaining and trying to 
defend some semblance of collective bargaining.”198 Although the Liberal government undertook 
two BC Code reviews during its tenure, in 2003 and 2007, neither BBB nor the Baigent-Ready 
Model in particular appear to have been either raised or addressed in either review.199  
 A historically close May 2017 provincial election produced no majority, and, after the 
NDP’s non-confidence motion passed in late June, the party was invited by the Lieutenant-
Governor to form a minority government. This minority government depends upon a NDP-BC 
Green Party “Confidence and Supply” agreement to retain power.200  
In early February 2018, the NDP government announced a review of the BC Code would 
be undertaken by a tripartite panel of special advisors: arbitrator Mike Fleming, employer-side 
counsel Barry Dong, and union-side counsel Sandra Banister (the “Review Panel”). Although the 
Review Panel was given a broad mandate, it was also clear that the Minister of Labour was not 
prepared to undertake a review on the scale of the recent Ontario CWR. The government appeared 
to be prepared to act on some longstanding concerns, and there was a sense of urgency to amending 
the legislation.201 The process included seeking written submissions and holding regional meetings 
in the spring, with a final report to be submitted to the government in August 2018.  
BBB was addressed by both labour and employers in this review, although the Review 
Panel noted that they “conflate the concepts of multi-employer certification and multi-employer 
bargaining.”202 Several union submissions dealt with BBB, with many emphasising that, unlike 
Ontario, BC has a long and established history of BBB structures in both its public and private 
                                                          
198 John Weir, interview.  
199 British Columbia, LRCRC, Report of the B.C. Labour Relations Code Review Committee 
Regarding the role of Members of the Labour Relations Board (Victoria: Ministry of Labour, 
2007); British Columbia, LRCRC, Report of the B.C. Labour Relations Code Review Committee 
to the Minister of Skills Development and Labour (Victoria: Ministry of Labour, 2003). 
200 British Columbia, “2017 Confidence and Supply Agreement between the BC Green Caucus and 




201 Anita Zaenker, interview by author. 
202 British Columbia, Labour Relations Code Review Panel, A Report to the Honourable Harry 
Bains Minister of Labour / Recommendations for Amendments to the Labour Relations Code 
(Victoria, BC: Ministry of Labour, 2018), 17.  
35 
 
sectors.203 However, and although Review Panel members had asked the labour community about 
BBB,204 most submissions simply included a general call for multi-employer sectoral certification, 
but without a specific proposal or any details, with several specifying that this be for “traditionally 
difficult to organize sectors,”205 calling for a committee of special advisors to be struck to examine 
this issue and to make recommendations,206 or for BBB for franchisees.207  
 The first specific BBB proposal was offered by United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 
1518: a proposal for BBB in the franchise context, based on one of the Ontario CWR Final Report 
Recommendations.208 Two other organizations, the Migrant Workers’ Centre and the Vancouver 
Committee for Domestic Workers and Caregivers Rights also offered specific proposals, and these 
were influenced by existing broader-based, centralized bargaining structures in BC’s public sector, 
and a BBB proposal developed in the early 1990s by a domestic workers’ organization in 
Ontario.209 The first proposed a two-tier BBB representation and bargaining structure to apply to 
caregivers in the private sector, modelled on the statutory structure existing in BC’s publicly 
funded health and community social services sector. The second contemplated mandatory 
province-wide bargaining (including sectoral certification and bargaining), employing the central 
workers’ registry existing under the BC ESA, and including establishment of a Tri-partite 
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Standards Committee under the BC Code, to negotiate, set, and enforce labour and employment 
standards for the sector. Such standards would be subject to government approval, before being 
enacted as regulations.  
 Notably, the submissions of neither the BC Fed, nor several other key organizations and 
unions, made any reference to BBB.210 However, the BC Fed had chosen to include only proposals 
which were unanimously supported by its affiliates. The BC Fed asked affiliates to make their own 
submissions on other issues.211 
Also of note was that BBB was “raised more consistently and vocally by employers than 
unions” in the consultation process, including in a joint submission by thirteen private sector 
employer organizations and employers, a group regarded as the dominant employer voice in this 
process.212 Employer submissions characterized BBB as a threat to businesses’ autonomy and self-
determination that would disregard the needs and circumstances of individual businesses, and 
would deprive newly certified employers of control over terms and conditions of their own 
business, potentially imposing unaffordable terms and conditions on these employers, and 
violating the BC Code principle that parties have a direct voice in terms and conditions of 
employment.213 Several employers in the technology industry emphasized the heterogeneity of 
enterprises in that sector, and argued that common interests among employers is a pre-condition to 
non-disruptive BBB structures.214 Other employer submissions also characterized statutory BBB 
as “a step back in time,”215  emphasizing the trend towards decentralized bargaining in other 
English-speaking jurisdictions,216 and arguing that although BBB may be appropriate in some 
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industries where there exists an established history of collective bargaining, it is not appropriate 
for industries lacking this history.217 In particular, franchise sector representatives contended that 
sectoral representation and bargaining would threaten the viability of the franchise model and, 
therefore, investment in the province.218 
The minority status of the NDP government and significant differences in priorities and 
perspectives between the NDP and Greens provides a complicated context for labour law reform 
in BC. The Green party leader Andrew Weaver has adamantly opposed a key NDP labour law 
reform goal, reinstitution of the card-based certification process, and was quoted as saying “I will 
never support legislation that will eliminate the secret ballot …. It’s simply not going to 
happen.”219 More recently Weaver has stated that the BC Greens will consider proposed BC Code 
amendments on their merits.220 The Confidence and Supply agreement offers little assurance of 
Green support for NDP labour law reform efforts. It explicitly provides that the NDP will consult 
with the Green party and “BC Green support for policy and legislation which does not relate to 
confidence or supply is not subject to this agreement and will be decided on an issue by issue 
basis.”221  
The Review Panel’s final report, submitted to the Minister on 31 August 2018, concluded 
that it had not received sufficient information or analysis to make specific recommendations about 
either sectoral certification or bargaining. It did, however, suggest that sectoral certification be 
studied by a single-issue commission, and recommended that sectoral, multi-employer bargaining 
be considered by an industrial inquiry commission or industry councils pursuant to section 80 of 
the BC Code.222 The subsequent amendments to the BC Code, passed in May 2019, did not address 
BBB, although provided for stronger successorship rights upon contract retendering in specified 
sectors.223  
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Over the last three decades, broader-based and sectoral bargaining proposals have arisen in 
numerous private sector collective bargaining law reform episodes across the country. In each case 
BBB failed to garner widespread support and frequently met with opposition from the labour 
movement. Proposals were also received with varying degrees of employer opposition and 
government disinterest. In every instance BBB proposals failed to be incorporated into subsequent 
legislative amendments.  
Given that the structural challenges of enterprise-based representation and bargaining, 
intensified by the continuing shift towards smaller workplaces and non-standard work 
arrangements; growing inequality; and, more effective employer resistance to unions are among 
the key difficulties faced by unions and workers, it is surprising that the labour movement has not 
embraced and prioritized BBB reforms. This is particularly perplexing in the face of long-standing 
evidence that centralized and coordinated bargaining structures are associated with better 
workplace and labour market outcomes for workers and unions. 
The present study sought, through interviews of union representatives, researchers and 
policy advisors involved in labour law reform episodes within the period under study, to reach a 
better understanding of the labour movement’s lack of strong engagement with this issue, given 
that unions and their members appeared to have the most to gain from BBB reforms. 
Earlier assessments of labour law reform in Ontario and British Columbia in the 1990s have 
explained these failures as arising from strong employer resistance to the proposals; widespread 
lack of knowledge or understanding of the concept (especially among the labour movement), or 
by characterizing BBB as a concept too foreign to be introduced to the Wagner Model of collective 
bargaining.224 However, these explanations are not adequate to explain the continued failure of 
BBB proposals in recent decades, and the present study offers evidence for a different 
understanding of this recurring phenomenon.  
First, while vehement employer opposition may have contributed to failure of BBB 
proposals in the 1990s, strong employer opposition to BBB was not been a prominent feature of 
recent collective bargaining law reform experiences. Therefore, additional explanations must be 
considered.  
Second, earlier studies suggest that the labour movement’s lack of support for, and even 
opposition to, BBB was rooted in a lack of understanding of the notion. However, recent labour 
law reform episodes demonstrate that, unlike what may have been the case in the 1990s, there is 
now substantial awareness and understanding of BBB within the labour movement, and that unions 
have been willing to inform themselves about the concept, including discussing and actively 
seeking to understand other unions’ differing views.225 Similarly, lack of understanding of the 
growing crisis in unionization is not a satisfactory explanation. While there was limited recognition 
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within the labour movement in the 1990s of the necessity for new modes of organizing and 
bargaining, including broader-based approaches, there can be no doubt that today’s labour 
movement is aware of the critical difficulties facing unions. 
In contrast with earlier research, the present study offers a different explanation for some 
unions’ lack of support for, or opposition to, BBB. It finds that union resistance arises from three 
sources. First, concern that BBB threatens some unions’ ability to preserve existing representation 
rights. Second, some unions’ resistance to the prospect of being required to participate in a council 
of unions in which their own bargaining power may be diluted. Third, anticipation of jurisdictional 
conflicts among unions resulting from new, broader-based representation and bargaining 
structures. Additionally, it became evident in the course of this study that the consensus approach 
taken by peak labour organizations to decide which labour law reform issues to advocate for 
explains the silence and lack of advocacy for BBB by many labour federations. These sources of 
resistance explain unions’ lack of support for BBB in both early and contemporary labour law 
reform efforts, and may be the most significant barriers to adoption of BBB in the future. 
Finally, past studies appear to attribute government’s disinterest in BBB reforms to lack of 
knowledge of the concept. This is difficult to reconcile with the active exploration of the issue by 
some of those tasked with making labour law reform recommendations, such as the urgent 
invitations by members of the 1992 BC Sub-committee and the 2015 Ontario CWR to the labour 
relations community to provide BBB submissions and input, which met with limited response.  A 
more compelling explanation is that governments have been unwilling to undertake novel reform 
which is likely to meet with employer opposition, and which has little union support. Given the 
highly politicized nature of labour law reform, and, therefore, the political cost of innovative and 
untried changes, it is not surprising that governments opted to forgo such a contentious route, 
despite the socio-economic benefits it may produce, particularly for workers. 
Looking ahead to a future likely to continue to be characterized by ongoing, if not 
accelerating, stagnation or decline in union density, growth of smaller workplaces, waning of 
traditional employment relationships, and increasing inequality, the potentially stabilizing effects 
of BBB may be of more importance to workers than ever while it may also appear to be a greater 
threat to the survival of vulnerable unions. As a result, the labour movement and its peak 
organizations may have to directly confront the dilemma of whether to try to protect certain 
individual unions’ existing rights or whether to try to protect the broader labour movement, and 
workers, through pursuing BBB. 
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